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The familiar saying “money is power” carries two meanings: one is common 
in the United States today; the other less so. 
The common meaning asserts that money buys power and therefore that 
economic inequality tends towards, or causes, political inequality. According to 
this idea, the rich can use their income and wealth to pay lobbyists and influence 
legislation, to subsidize political campaigns and influence elections, and even to 
buy publicity and influence public opinion. In the limit case, the rich deploy 
these and other related methods to monopolize political power. Political 
scientists increasingly document that the limit case is not just possible, but 
becoming actual. 
The uncommon meaning asserts, directly, that money is power, and therefore 
that no contingent causes are required to connect economic and political 
inequality. This idea begins by reflecting on the nature of money.1 Imagine, the 
idea proposes, that a society distributes goods and services using an array of 
vouchers that name specific items (as when wartime rationing boards issued 
coupons for “one pound of butter,” for example, or “one pint of milk”) and 
requires anyone who wishes to have one of these items to give over an 
appropriate coupon, sending government agents to deploy force against those 
who attempt to get an item without one. The vouchers, in this system, are not 
properly understood as things at all. Rather, they administer an accounting 
system that keeps track of and controls people, specifically regarding what 
things people may have or use. The vouchers, that is, constitute relations of 
constraint. Moreover, money is simply an abstract and generalized version of 
this voucher system: A $20 bill is just a voucher that permits its bearer to 
consume any disjunction of conjunctions of goods and services that cost less 
than $20. Money, therefore, is no more a thing that the vouchers would be. 
Rather—again, just like the vouchers—money is an accounting system that 
constitutes relations of constraint. Money, in other words, is power. To deny this 
is to fall into commodity fetishism, in the classic sense of misconstruing 
relations of constraint as things. 
The common and uncommon understandings of the connection between 
economic and political inequality carry very different ideological valences. In 
this sense, also, the first view falls inside, and the second outside, the normal 
range of contemporary U.S.-American political discourse. 
 
1 The discussion below follows G.A. Cohen, Back to Socialist Basics, NEW LEFT REVIEW 
I/207, at 3-16 (September-October 1994). 
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The worry that money can buy power is quintessentially liberal. It insists on 
the autonomy of politics—the idea that political equality can sensibly be 
understood (even if not always achieved) apart from economic equality. 
Liberalism’s more hopeful strands then argue that good laws can contain 
economic power to preserve the autonomy of politics. Liberalism’s less hopeful 
strands worry that this is difficult or impossible. In the jargon of the moment, 
they worry about the hydraulic problem of money in politics—the problem that 
any efforts to keep money from buying power through one channel will simply 
divert the money to buying power through another. 
The uncommon worry that money is power belongs to a more radical 
tradition. This tradition has also received expression in U.S.-American legal 
thought—for example, in Robert Hale’s classic Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State—but it belongs, quintessentially, to European 
socialism. The idea that money is power denies the autonomy of politics and 
hence also denies that political equality is intelligible as a free-standing value at 
all. The problem, according to this view, is not that money can interfere with 
politics, but rather that there exists no meaningful category politics with which 
to interfere. In the jargon of orthodox Marxism, base determines superstructure. 
Neither familiar formulation quite suits current conditions, however. 
The common, liberal view seems increasingly naïve. Lived experience plainly 
shows that politics is not autonomous today and, equally plainly, that economic 
inequality allows the rich to dominate the poor. Even the less hopeful 
formulation of the liberal view seems not really to come to grips with this 
problem. The hydraulic metaphor suggests that wealth leaks into politics in ways 
that cannot be all closed off at once. But money in politics is less like a leak that 
cannot be contained and more like an overwhelming flood. Hydraulic pressure 
has nothing to do with this problem, which is all about quantity, so that economic 
power no longer just infects politics but rather causes politics proper, in the 
liberal sense, to cease to exist. 
The radical view, for its part, also contradicts lived experience, this time by 
flattening differences and denying distinctions that matter in practice. Even in 
the United States, money simply did not infect politics at the middle of the last 
century as it does today. And—at least with respect to economic inequality2—
U.S.-American democracy once credibly approximated what Robert Dahl called 
“the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals.”3 International comparisons bolster this 
historical lesson: Wealth inequality in Switzerland and Denmark equals wealth 
inequality in the United States; but Swiss and Danish politics are not dominated 
by the rich in the U.S.-American fashion.4 In all these cases, capitalism and 
democracy co-existed. These are simply concrete and particular formulations of 
 
2 The same could not of course be said about inequalities concerning race and gender. 
3 ROBERT ALAN DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). 
4 See, e.g., James B. Davies et al., The Level and Distribution of Global Household Wealth 
56 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15508). 
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the abstract and general complaint that scientific socialism’s insistence that base 
dominates superstructure succumbs to unwarranted fatalism—to a false tyranny 
of no alternatives.5 
Ganesh Sitaraman’s outstanding book—The Crisis of the Middle-Class 
Constitution— enters these arguments about economics and politics to chart a 
fundamentally new course that avoids both shortcomings. Unlike conventional 
liberals, Sitaraman recognizes that money is power as well as buys power and 
that the economic inequality’s influence over political inequality is not cabined 
to the narrowly hydraulic channels that the liberal law of democracy fetishizes. 
This insight pervades Sitaraman’s book—in both its choice of subjects and its 
language. These come together in Sitaraman’s discussion of the progressive 
tradition in anti-trust, which he says, quoting Michael Sandel, worried that 
economic concentration “threatened self-government in two ways—directly by 
overwhelming democratic institutions and defying their control and indirectly, 
by eroding the moral and civic capacities that equip workers to think and act as 
citizens.”6 And unlike conventional socialists, Sitaraman recognizes that the 
economic perversions of present-day U.S.-American democracy are distinctive 
and contingent, rather than endemic to capitalist orders. Once again, this 
recognition pervades Sitaraman’s way of thinking: Indeed, the sense that 
something has gone wrong, and the urge to recover a tradition that is at once 
capitalist and democratic, motivates the entire book. 
Sitaraman’s fundamental idea is that the relationship between money and 
politics arises inside a constitutional structure and, in fact, is framed by a basic—
perhaps even the basic—constitutional choice. Middle-class constitutions accept 
that money can buy power but deny that money is power and are therefore, in 
their basic political economy, liberal. This political economy pervades middle-
class constitutional orders, perhaps most importantly in their insistent 
application of liberal legalism to the political process itself—their insistence on 
formal equality of political participation, on the negative liberty of speech and 
assembly, and on high proceduralism in lawmaking and administration. Class-
warfare constitutions, by contrast, acknowledge that money is power and adopt 
what might be called (although now speaking loosely) a socialist political 
economy. This political economy once again pervades class-warfare 
constitutional orders, which openly reject liberal legalism in their politics by 
violating formal political equality in order to secure political participation and 
even office-holding by economic caste; and by limiting the negative rights of the 
rich to speech, assembly, and due process as required to protect the positive 
political participation of the lower economic orders. 
 
5 See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN 
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987). 
6 See Michael J. Sandel, The Political Economy of Citizenship, in THE NEW MAJORITY: 
TOWARDS A POPULAR PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 133, 136 (Stanley B. Greenberg & Theda 
Skocpol eds., 1997). 
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Sitaraman’s secondary idea is that the United States, for distinctive 
intellectual, cultural, and economic reasons—and pursuing a minority 
approach—adopted a middle-class rather than a class-warfare constitution; and 
that the prerequisites—especially the economic conditions—for the success of 
middle-class constitutionalism no longer exist. Sitaraman’s general theory of the 
relationship between money and power, therefore, enables him to make a 
distinctive—and distinctively deep—diagnosis of the present U.S.-American 
predicament. 
A tertiary set of ideas addresses how to respond to this predicament, so 
diagnosed. Sitaraman recognizes that conventional liberal proposals—campaign 
finance reform, lobbying reform—are structurally mismatched to the scale of 
the breach that they hope to repair. He also recognizes that his diagnosis leads 
naturally to two very different courses of treatment: to remake the U.S. 
Constitution along class-warfare lines; and to remake the U.S. economic order 
to recover the conditions that make a middle-class constitution sustainable. 
Sitaraman prefers the second approach, although he never really makes clear 
how the policies needed to rebuild the middle class might be achieved within a 
constitutional structure weakened by the very dysfunctions that these policies 
aspire to address. In this sense, Sitaraman’s cure mistakes the depth of his own 
diagnosis. 
Even so, Sitaraman opens up a conceptual space for hope that familiar 
arguments leave closed. Liberals who acknowledge that money can buy power 
but deny that money is power fall prey to a quietist complacency. Their solutions 
are badly out-of-scale to the problems that beset U.S.-American democracy. 
Socialists who insist that money is power and that base dominates superstructure 
fall prey to fatalism and despair. They abandon hope of finding any political 
solution to political inequality. 
Sitaraman’s book engenders hope by showing that not just one but two 
alternative arrangements can sustain democratic political equality against the 
forces of capitalism, and that the United States has in the past achieved one of 
these arrangements. The book provokes fear by laying bare just how much will 
be required to recover this democratic past and just how great the forces arrayed 
against democracy today really are. 
 
